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Abstract 
Indian central and state governments have imposed restrictions on human mobility to slow the 
spread of COVID-19. Based on state government directives and mobility data from Google, we 
find that similar restrictions did not lead to equal reductions in mobility across states before 
the national lockdown. Maharashtra’s restrictions were the most effective in reducing mobility 
by a large margin. The national lockdown had a larger and more uniform effect for most states. 
 
Regional Variation in the spread of COVID-19 
The COVID-19 pandemic has spread unequally across regions within India, with five states 
accounting for more than 70 percent of active cases till 5th May. Restrictions on human mobility 
and social distancing measures are found to slow the spread of infectious diseases, by reducing 
contact among people (Bajardi et al, 2011). Supporting empirical evidence also exists for the 
ongoing coronavirus pandemic (Fang et al, 2020). Indian state governments imposed such 
restrictions up to 24th March, until the Central government finally declared a national 
lockdown. The restrictions were recognized as among the most stringent in the world, laying 
down a uniform policy and overriding state governments. The national lockdown ended on 3rd 
May. States were then given back the authority to manage their own outbreaks, with a few 
central directives.1  
In the initial weeks of March, states reacted with differing speed and stringency to the rising 
number of infections, with different outcomes in terms of reducing mobility.  Using data on 
state-wise restrictions and mobility changes for 31 Indian States and UTs from February 15 to 
April 26, we try to understand if all states performed equally in reducing mobility. We also 
compare the mobility-reducing effects of stringency in the phase before the national lockdown, 
                                                          
1State governments could relax restrictions  in districts reporting no new infections for 28 days. (Source: 
https://ndma.gov.in/images/covid/MoHFW-Letter-States-reg-containment-of-Hotspots.pdf) 
with the subsequent period. As India’s current containment strategy is again based on state-
level decisions, evidence from the pre-lockdown experience is illustrative.  
Measuring stringency of government restrictions 
Mobility restrictions imposed by states included one or more of the following measures: bans 
on public gatherings, declaration of a health emergency, internal travel restrictions, closure of 
services, and finally declaration of a ‘lockdown’. Based on state-wise government orders and 
news reports, we categorize these restrictions into eight indicators (Figure 1). This is similar, 
but not identical, to the OxCGRT classification of containment and closure measures (Hale et 
al, 2020).2  
 
Figure 1: Categories of Government Restrictions3 
We record these measures using binary variables which equal 1 for days on which the policy 
is in effect. These variables are added to generate a daily stringency score for each state. The 
value of the stringency score represents the relative intensity of restrictions in effect, with zero 
                                                          
2
 The OxCGRT (Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker) collects data on policy responses to 
COVID-19 at the national level. In contrast, our dataset compiles government responses at the state level. It will 
be shared on request. 
 
3
 A Lockdown imposes a complete ban of non-essential services, transportation and effectively imposes curfew.   
as the minimum. The maximum value of the stringency score is 8. Every state attains its 
maximum value by 24th March, with the commencement of the national lockdown.  
Table 1: State-wise dates of first cases and stringency of responses 
 
(Note: Data for cases taken from covid19india.org) 
States/UT First Date of 
any Case 
First Date of 
any Response 
Date of 
Declaring 
Lockdown 
Maximum 
Stringency 
score 
(Before 24th 
March) 
Early Affected States: restrictions came after first case 
Kerala 31-Jan-20 11-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 3 
NCT of Delhi 02-Mar-20 13-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 4 
Telangana 02-Mar-20 15-Mar-20 23-Mar-20 2 
Rajasthan 03-Mar-20 14-Mar-20 23-Mar-20 3 
Haryana 04-Mar-20 16-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 3 
Uttar Pradesh 04-Mar-20 14-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 2 
Tamil Nadu 07-Mar-20 17-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 3 
Karnataka 09-Mar-20 14-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 2 
Maharashtra 09-Mar-20 18-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 2 
Punjab 09-Mar-20 14-Mar-20 22-Mar-20 7 
Andhra Pradesh 12-Mar-20 20-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 2 
Late Affected States: restrictions came before first case 
Uttarakhand 15-Mar-20 15-Mar-20 23-Mar-20 3 
Odisha 16-Mar-20 14-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 5 
Puducherry 18-Mar-20 18-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 3 
West Bengal 18-Mar-20 16-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 4 
Chandigarh 19-Mar-20 14-Mar-20 23-Mar-20 3 
Chhattisgarh 19-Mar-20 14-Mar-20 20-Mar-20 4 
Gujarat 20-Mar-20 16-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 3 
Himachal Pradesh 21-Mar-20 15-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 4 
Madhya Pradesh 21-Mar-20 15-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 2 
Bihar 22-Mar-20 14-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 6 
Manipur 24-Mar-20 13-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 4 
Mizoram 25-Mar-20 10-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 3 
Goa 26-Mar-20 15-Mar-20 22-Mar-20 3 
Assam 01-Apr-20 16-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 2 
Jharkhand 01-Apr-20 17-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 5 
Arunachal Pradesh 03-Apr-20 18-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 3 
Tripura 07-Apr-20 16-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 2 
Meghalaya 13-Apr-20 17-Mar-20 24-Mar-20 2 
Nagaland 12-Apr-20 17-Mar-20 22-Mar-20 5 
 
Table 1 shows that states had varied delays between reporting their first cases, and instituting 
their first measures. By 11 March, Kerala was the only state which had enacted any measure 
in response to COVID-19. Andhra Pradesh was the last state to implement any restrictions.  
Measuring changes in mobility 
Google provides Community Mobility Report data at the state level, recording changes in 
mobility trends for six categories4 of locations. It provides the change in mobility for each day 
of the week, relative to its baseline level (median during Jan 3 – Feb 6, 2020). We calculate a 
weekly mobility index, averaging across categories.5 This index represents relative mobility 
for each state, ranging from 0 to 1. The maximum value of 1 represents the baseline mobility.  
A value of 0.5 means that mobility was at 50% of baseline level, for that state. 
 
             (a)        (b) 
Figure 2: Chloropleth maps of mobility and stringency on 21 March, (a) Stringency score. Darker 
is more stringent. (b) Avg. mobility level. Darker means lower level of mobility.         Note: Jammu and 
Kashmir was recently split into two UTs - J&K and Ladakh. Mobility data and updated shapefiles are 
not available for the new UTs. Hence J&K has not been included in the map. 
 
As figure 2a shows, every state had enacted at least one mobility restriction by 21st March. 
Mobility had reduced from baseline levels in all states (figure 2b), with darker shade 
                                                          
4
 These are grocery and pharmacy stores, parks, transit stations, retail and recreational establishments (including 
restaurants and malls) workplaces and residences. 
5
 A normalized weekly mobility index was calculated by the following steps: 
a. We generate weekly averages for mobility in of the five location categories (excluding residences).   
b. We construct a composite weekly mobility index by taking the mean of the above variables. 
c. We normalize the index to take a value of 1 at the maximum and 0 at the minimum mobility value for each 
state. 
representing a lower level of (a higher reduction in) mobility. If a state has the same shade in 
both maps, its stringency score was proportionate to its mobility reduction. With a stringency 
score of 2, Maharashtra saw the highest fall in mobility, to 38% of its baseline level. In contrast, 
Arunachal Pradesh’s mobility was at 78% of baseline, despite a higher stringency score of 3. 
We plot the changes in mobility and stringency with time for six states (three early affected 
and three late affected) in figure 3. The blue line shows (normalized) stringency score, which 
changes sharply with new government restrictions. The red line represents weekly mobility 
levels. Some states raised stringency more gradually (like Delhi), while others (like Arunachal 
Pradesh) imposed several restrictions simultaneously. The relative ‘effectiveness’ of 
restrictions can be inferred from the drops in average mobility.    
 
Figure 3: Time series plots of average weekly mobility and stringency score, for six Indian states 
(March 4-April 15). Values are scaled to between 0 and 100. The vertical axis represents each quantity 
as a percentage of its maximum. Dashed vertical line represents 24th March. 
 
With the lockdown, stringency hits its maximum value for each state and does not change for 
the duration the plot. Weekly mobility falls drastically, in most cases reaching the minimum 
value (zero) compared to baseline. Exceptions like Arunachal Pradesh and Delhi did not reach 
their respective minimum values in the first week of the lockdown (Mar 24-Mar 31), settling 
at 5% and 3% of baselines respectively. By the second week of the lockdown, state-wise 
mobility had stabilized at higher, but different levels (e.g. to 15% of baseline in Kerala and 
Bihar). Clearly, similar rises in stringency reduced mobility by different levels for each state.  
Quantifying the impact of state-wise restrictions on mobility 
To estimate the effect of stringency of restrictions on mobility, we employ a panel regression 
model with different effects sizes for each state. The model accounts for two additional 
features. First, there are systematic differences across states. Second, within states mobility 
depends on its own past values.6 We estimate two separate regressions, one for the time period 
before the lockdown (15 Feb – 22 March), and the other for the lockdown period (22 march – 
26 Apr).  
 
Figure 4: Coefficient plot of panel regression.  The value of the coefficient represents the percentage 
change in weekly mobility associated with a 100% increase in the stringency score, individually for 
each state. Blue squares represents estimates pre-lockdown period (February 15 – March 22). Red 
circles represent estimates for lockdown period (March 22 – April 26). Spikes are 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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 Our dataset consists of 31 states from February 15 to April 26, for a total of 2,160 state-day observations. We fit 
a linear panel data model of mobility using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), with state-specific 
coefficients for stringency. Residuals do not have constant variance across states, due to differences in state-
specific characteristics other than stringency. These residuals are also likely to be dependent on their own past 
values, i.e. they are autocorrelated within states. We deal with this by specifying a heteroskedastic error structure 
across panels, and a panel-specific AR(1) autocorrelation of the residuals.  
Increases in stringency had a negative effect on weekly mobility for all states in the pre-
lockdown period, (blue squares in figure 4).  But effect sizes varied widely across states. 
Maharashtra saw the highest decline in mobility in response to restrictions.7 Each 100% rise in 
stringency score reduced average weekly mobility by around 200%. On the other extreme, 
Punjab, Rajasthan and Telangana’s restrictions were less effective, causing less than 40% 
declines in weekly mobility for similar rise in stringency 
In the national lockdown period, the impact of restrictions were much higher for most states 
(red circles in figure 4). Except the few states which already saw reductions of more than 100%, 
a rise in stringency by 100% reduced mobility by more than 75% (on average). The variation 
in the impact is also lesser, both across and within states. The national lockdown was able to 
elicit higher and more uniform mobility reductions across states. 
 
Conclusion 
States varied in their ability to reduce mobility through restrictions due to a number of possible 
reasons. Many of the worst affected districts (like Mumbai, Delhi, Indore) are among the 
country’s most densely urbanized clusters. The ‘Red Zone’ districts consist of 53% of 
economic output.  There were also instances of mass reverse migration from cities to villages 
after restrictions began to be imposed, which might have led to spikes in mobility. Thirdly, 
people’s levels of awareness about COVID-19 leads to falls in mobility, as they curtail 
movement to avoid exposure.8 Finally, states with weaker institutions might lack the ability to 
effectively implement mobility restrictions. Some variations in mobility changes are thus 
related to systematic features of states (urbanization or level of awareness). Other variations 
stem from more random sources. For instance, major religious gatherings occurred in Kerala 
and New Delhi in the days before the national lockdown.  
The pandemic has raised difficult questions about decentralised public health responses versus 
uniform, centralised decisions. COVID-19 is projected to have a trajectory of ‘rolling waves’ 
of infection, and is unlikely to see a permanent decline within the next few months. Until a 
vaccine or cure is developed, governments will have to constantly monitor trends in the number 
of cases, and adjust or relax restrictions accordingly. India is now entering a period likely to be 
characterized by high state-wise heterogeneity in restrictions; extending to the district and 
                                                          
7
 J&K had a higher coefficient, but the confidence interval was too wide. 
8
 Fang et al (2020) split this effect into a ‘virus effect’ and ‘panic effect’  
intra-city levels. Our empirical analysis shows that in the initial phase of mobility restrictions, 
equal actions did not lead to equal effects for all states. Moreover, the national lockdown had 
a more uniform negative impact on mobility across states. The current decentralised approach 
should be informed based on these previous experiences.  
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